INTRODUCTION PURPOSE SCOPE OF THE REPORT ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS U. Organizations and Programs to Evaluate and Ensure Treaty Compliance OVERVIEW PART I: U. COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS U. INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ORGANIZATION FOR ENSURING COMPLIANCE U. COMPLIANCE Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 1925 Geneva Protocol Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) Treaty and Vienna Document 2011 (VD11) Treaty on Open Skies (OST) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty or NST) Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required For Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (“Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement,” or PMDA) PART II: COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA) OR OTHER SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS THE UNITED STATES BILATERALLY CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS SUCCESSOR STATES INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY NEW START TREATY (NST) PART III: COMPLIANCE BY STATES PARTY (INCLUDING SUCCESSOR STATES PARTY) WITH MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH THE UNITED STATES BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC) Russia TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) Burma Iran North Korea Syria TREATY ON OPEN SKIES (OST) PART IV: ADHERENCE BY PARTICIPATING STATES (INCLUDING SUCCESSOR STATES) TO POLITICALLY BINDING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS VIENNA DOCUMENT 2011 ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (VD11) Russia Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS China PART V: STATES’ ADHERENCE TO CERTAIN UNILATERAL COMMITMENTS MORATORIA ON NUCLEAR TESTING This Report is submitted pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U. The unclassified version of this Report recounts as much information as possible, but certain issues can be discussed only at higher levels of classification. In such ways, such agreements and commitments can contribute broadly to transparency and stability on a global and regional scale. 2593a), which requires a report by the President on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. The issues addressed in this Report primarily reflect activities from January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, unless otherwise noted. The Compliance Report includes reporting and analysis at the levels of classification for which reliable supporting information is available. and allies’ security, including by limiting participating States’ access to or engagement in dangerous or destabilizing capabilities or activities, providing insight and transparency into the actions of participating States, and encouraging stabilizing patterns of behavior and interaction.It establishes a nuclear “threshold” by prohibiting each Party from undertaking underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control.The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty governs underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties other than the test sites specified under the TTBT.The United States also is compliant with its CWC obligations related to commercial activities. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty All U. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the INF Treaty.
As noted above, there can sometimes be legal or factual uncertainty as to whether a violation has occurred. executive branch, including at the Do D, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that operate to ensure that plans and programs under those departments’ and agencies’ purview remain consistent with U. These processes and controls operate in parallel, and in addition to the congressional oversight process.Where possible, the United States continues to pursue resolution of those issues with the States in question, as well as to assess the implications of these States’ actions and how best the United States should respond to them. As a reflection of the seriousness with which we view these obligations, the United States has established legal and institutional procedures to ensure U. The samples’ incomplete inactivation (thoroughly disclosed by the U. Government and extensively documented in the press) was an unintentional biosafety lapse, but not a violation of U. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997.The United States continues to work toward meeting its CWC obligations with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons (CW) and associated CW facilities.The United States continues to update the OPCW on U. destruction efforts, consistent with the November 2011 adoption by the OPCW Conference of States Party of transparency measures to provide States Party and the OPCW with additional confidence in the continued commitment of States Party - and their progress toward - complete, verified destruction of their chemical weapons under the CWC.The United States has provided a full and complete declaration of its CW and associated CW facilities. CWC Regulations (15 CFR 710 et seq.) require commercial facilities exceeding CWC-specified activity thresholds to submit annual declarations, notifications, and other reports, including on past and anticipated activities, and to permit systematic and routine verification through on‑site inspections of declared commercial facilities.